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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the consequences on growth and welfare of imposing limits to public 
borrowing. In the model economy, government spending may play two different roles, either as 
input in the production function, or providing services directly in the utility function. In these 
setups I study the effects of different fiscal policies with and without debt limits both in the 
balanced growth path and during the transitional dynamics. In the long run, if there is no limit, the 
growth effects of raising labor income taxes are negative, regardless of the role of government 
spending. However, the role public spending is crucial for the growth effects of changes in the 
ratio of public expenditures to output. In the presence of a limit to debt, higher labor tax rates have 
a positive effect on growth if government spending is productive. The opposite is true when 
private capital drives growth. Regarding welfare, raising labor income taxes imply a lower 
welfare cost of reducing debt than does cutting government spending, when this is productive. 
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of imposing limits to public borrowing.
Macroeconomists have long debated the e¤ects of government spending on economic growth. In
addition to the way government spending is employed in the economy, research has also focused
on the instruments to nance this expenditure, such as taxes and debt issue.
The e¤ects of public debt in growth models has usually been analyzed by imposing only
a no-Ponzi game condition on the limiting behavior of debt. Little attention has been paid
to tighter constraints on public borrowing. Recently, however, this topic has gained growing
interest because of the criteria imposed on the EMU countries by the Maastricht Treaty and
later reinforced by the Stability Pact. These criteria required, among other things, the ratios of
public debt and decits over GDP not to be above 60% and 3%, respectively. Furthermore, it is
widely recognized that high ratios of debt to GDP are not desirable for the economy. This has
led many countries to reduce government decits and control the rate of growth of public debt.
In this paper I analyze the e¤ects of scal policy on growth and welfare when there are
limits to public debt. In the model economy, government spending may play two di¤erent roles,
either acting as an input to the production function, or providing services directly in the utility
function. In these setups I study the e¤ects of scal policy (changes in taxes and the ratio of
government spending to output) with and without debt limits both in the balanced growth path
and during the transitional dynamics.
The literature on the imposition of limits on public borrowing can be structured in two main
branches. The rst one investigates the consequences of the credit market discipline hypothesis.1
This line of research states that individualsbehavior in credit markets may constrain government
borrowing. In particular, private agents may ask for risk premia that would be increasing in
the amount of outstanding public debt. The governments ability to pay for these premia will
determine its access to borrowing from the private sector. It is in this way that credit market
conditions limit government borrowing.
The second branch focuses on the e¤ects of exogenously imposed limits to debt, for example
in the way it is done by the Maastricht Treaty. In this context, Uctum and Wickens (1997)
1See for example Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995).
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examine from the econometric viewpoint, the e¤ects of imposing debt ceilings on the government
intertemporal budget constraint. Their analysis is applied to US and EU data since 1970. They
nd that current scal policy is not sustainable for most industrialized countries over an innite
horizon, but it is sustainable in the medium term in the absence of ceilings. Chari and Kehoe
(1998) analyze the need for scal constraints in the implementation of monetary unions, specially
in the case of the European Monetary Union. In a standard economic model with benevolent
policy makers, they nd that it is desirable to impose scal constraints whenever the monetary
authority cannot commit to future policies. Finally, Woodford (1996) analyzes the role of limits
on the rate of growth of public debt in order to maintain price stability.
None of these papers focuses on the e¤ects on growth. However, if government spending
a¤ects the equilibrium of the economy, and is partially nanced by issuing debt, it is important
to analyze the consequences of limiting this source of nancing. There is a vast literature on the
growth e¤ects of scal policies in endogenous growth models. Most papers like Barro (1990),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), and Baier and Glomm (2001) focus on the growth e¤ects of
distortionary taxes when government spending a¤ects private returns of the agents. However,
most of them abstract from public debt. In contrast, the present work introduces government
debt in a framework in which growth issues can be easily addressed.
The model developed here nests Barros (1990) and Romers (1986) models of growth. In the
rst case, productive government spending is introduced in the production function enhancing
both capital and labor productivity, and permitting endogenous growth. In the second case,
public spending enters the households utility function and endogenous growth is generated by
an externality involving learning by doing.
The analysis focuses on both the balanced growth path and the transitional dynamics. Due
to the introduction of labor-leisure choice, no closed form analytical solution is available, so I
recur to numerical solutions for the competitive equilibrium. Several simulations are carried out
to study the e¤ects of changes in scal variables (taxes on labor income, and the ratio public
expenditures over output). I study how the outcome di¤ers, depending on the role given to
government spending in each economy and whether there is a debt limit or not. The analysis
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of the dynamics explains not only how growth rates are a¤ected, but also shed some light on
individualswelfare.
I nd that in the long run raising tax rates on labor has positive e¤ects on growth when
there are limits to debt and government spending is productive. However, when learning by
doing drives growth, rising taxes on labor only serves to reduce the incentives to work, with a
negative e¤ect on the growth rate. A reduction in government spending has negative e¤ects on
growth if public spending is productive, but has negligible e¤ects if public spending only a¤ects
utility, in both cases regardless of the presence of a debt limit.
These results are supplemented by a study of the dynamic e¤ects of tightening scal policy
to reduce public debt in order to attain a lower debt to output ratio in the case of productive
government spending. Compared with the initial balanced growth path, raising taxes to lower
debt leads the economy to a new balanced growth path with higher growth and lower taxes
because of the role of government spending in this model. By the same reason, a scal policy
consisting of reducing government spending over output has the opposite e¤ects, reducing growth
and output. Regarding welfare, if the government must achieve a lower debt limit, higher labor
income taxes imply a lower welfare cost than reducing government spending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy. Sections
3 and 4 characterize the competitive equilibrium and the balanced growth path, respectively.
Section 5 covers the parameterization of the model. In Section 6, I report the results for the long
run analysis. Section 7 deals with the dynamics of the model in response to changes in taxes
and or in the government spending to output ratio, and Section 8 contains the welfare analysis.
Finally, conclusions and extensions close the paper.
2 The model
In this section, I present an endogenous growth model in a general equilibrium framework. I
consider an economy composed by three types of agents: households, competitive rms and a
government. The population size is normalized to one, so that variables are in per capita terms.
In this economy private agents take as given scal policies when making their decisions.
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As mentioned above, the model extends to two di¤erent cases, each one displaying di¤erent
externalities. First, externalities arise because of public productive spending in the production
function à-la-Barro (1990); in the second case, externalities appear due to the existence of
learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers in the productive process à-la-Romer (1986). In
this last setup, government spending only supplies public services and enters additively into the
householdsutility function.
2.1 Households
The economy consists of a large number of identical innitely-lived individuals. Agents are
endowed with one unit of time to be divided between leisure, x(t), and labor, l(t). Households
consume a homogeneous good whose price is taken as numeraire and normalized to one. Individ-
uals derive utility from leisure, and from consuming private goods. When government spending
enters the utility function, individuals will also get some utility from public services. In general,
the utility function U [c(t); x(t); g(t)]; takes the appropriate functional form according to the
following CES utility function
U [c(t); x(t); g(t)] =
8>>><>>>:
[c(t)x(t)1 ]1  + [g(t) ]1 
1   if  6= 1
 ln c(t) + (1  ) lnx(t) +  ln g(t) if  = 1;
(1)
where c(t) is consumption per capita; x(t) is the proportion of time devoted to leisure; g(t)
is government spending;  > 0 refers to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is
constant;  2 [0; 1] reects the households preference between consumption and leisure, and
 > 0 is a parameter measuring the impact of g(t) on the welfare of the household. The
parameter  is assumed to be positive (so that public consumption yields a positive marginal
utility) and the following expressions must hold  1 < 1    < 1
1 +  
; and  (1   ) < 1;
to have a bounded utility.2 This Cobb-Douglas specication of the utility function together
with the constant returns to scale of the production function will allow for the existence of
2For the isoelastic utility function,  can also be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between
public and private goods and leisure. For the learning-by-doing model if preferences for government spending are
separable (or if the agent obtains no utility from government spending) then the wealth and substitution e¤ects
cancel and leisure remains unchanged, a condition required for the balanced growth in this model.
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endogenous growth.3 Finally, the parameter  has been introduced in order to study the e¤ects
of government spending entering or not the utility function, thus  = f0; 1g:
Households hold assets, d(t); which return some interest payments. This interest plus labor
income minus the amount spent in consumption, is devoted to the acquisition of new assets, as
reected in the following budget constraint:
_d(t) = r(t)d(t) + !(t)l(t)  c(t); (2)
where d(t) denotes the households wealth, composed of the stock of capital and government
bonds; and r(t) and !(t) refer to the interest rate and the after tax wage in terms of time t
consumption.
The representative discounts at a rate  > 0: His decision problem is given by
Max
fc(t);x(t); _d(t)g
Z +1
0
U [c(t); x(t); g(t)]e tdt
subject to _d(t) = r(t)d(t) + !(t)l(t)  c(t)
x(t) + l(t) = 1;
c(t)  0 for all t;
d(0) = d0 taken as given;
and the no-Ponzi game condition on assets
lim
t;1d(t) exp

 
Z t
0
r()d

 0; (3)
The Hamiltonian for the households problem is
H[c(t); l(t); d(t); (t)] = e tfU [c(t); l(t)] + (t)[r(t)d(t) + !(t)l(t)  c(t)]g; (4)
where (t) = (t)et is the shadow price associated to the households budget constraint.
The rst order conditions (FOC) for an interior solution to this problem are given by
c(t)(1 ) 1x(t)(1 )(1 ) = (t); (5)
3For a more detailed discussion, see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
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(1  )c(t)(1 )x(t)(1 )(1 ) 1 = (t)!(t); (6)
_(t) = (t)[  r(t)]; (7)
together with the transversality condition
lim
t!1e
 t(t)d(t) = 0: (8)
Equations (5)-(6) embody the two basic margins in this problem. First, the choice between
c(0) and c(t); given by equation (5), evaluated at times 0 and t; and second, the choice between
c(t) and x(t) that equating the marginal rate of substitution to the real wage.
2.2 Firms and technology
There is a large number of identical rms. Markets are competitive. The inputs are capital stock,
labor and government expenditure. The representative rm produces a nal good according to
a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function. The production function is given
by
y(t) = Ak(t)[l(t)
_
k(t)g(t)1 ]1 ; (9)
where  2 [0; 1]; y(t) is output, A > 0 is the scale parameter, k(t) is private capital, l(t) is labor,
_
k(t) denotes the aggregate level of capital, and g(t) is government expenditure. The parameter
 = f0; 1g measures the relative weight of
_
k(t) and g(t) in the production function, giving two
possible sources of endogenous growth.
Under the assumptions of competitive input markets and constant returns to scale in pro-
duction technology, factors are paid their marginal products. For capital this means
Rk(t) = Ak(t)
 1[l(t)
_
k(t)g(t)1 ]1 ; (10)
and for labor
W (t) = (1  )Ak(t)[
_
k(t)g(t)1 ]1 l(t) : (11)
As a result of this, the interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital after depre-
ciation
r(t) = Rk(t)  ; (12)
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while for the after-tax wage rate it is
!(t) = (1  w)W (t); (13)
where w denotes the tax rate on labor income.
2.3 Government
In this model, the government has a path for public expenditure, g(t), that is nanced through
taxes and debt, the government needs not run a balanced budget at every moment of time.
Thus, the path for government spending is nanced by taxation but also by debt. Tax revenues
come from at-tax rates on labor income, and debt is issued as government bonds held by the
households. The ow of government consumption is an exogenous constant fraction of total
production denoted by ; that is,
g(t)
y(t)
=  and  2 [0; 1]: (14)
With these assumptions the government budget constraint is the following:
_b(t) = Rb(t)b(t) + g(t)  wW (t)l(t); (15)
where Rb(t)b(t) denotes public debt expenses, g(t) is the ow of public expenditure, and the
remaining term in the equation refers to the revenues from at-tax rates on labor income, w;
that are constant. To completely describe the governments setup, there is the no-Ponzi game
condition on public debt
lim
t !1b(t) exp

 
Z t
0
Rb()d

 0: (16)
Denition 1 In the absence of a debt limit, a scal policy is a pair f; wg constant over time
which implies a path for government debt that satises the no-Ponzi game condition (16).
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2.3.1 The debt limit
Two possible scenarios are considered. In one case, the government will never be constrained
in issuing debt except for the no-Ponzi game condition (the standard setup in the literature),
whereas in the other case, there will be a limit imposed at some time T to the amount of debt
over output in the economy. Let (t) denote the debt-to-output ratio, that is,
b(t)
y(t)
. Using this
notation, the government budget constraint (15) can be expressed as follows
_(t) = [Rb(t)  y(t)](t) +    w(1  ): (17)
where y(t) is the growth rate of output, that is, y(t) =
_y(t)
y(y)
. This second case is captured by
the following chart:
for t  T  ! (t) evolves as (17) for t0  T  ! (t0)  _                                                 !
"
time t
"
time T
"
time t0
(18)
From t  T the path for (t) is given by equation (17). At a certain time, T; the debt ceiling is
enforced, and the government debt-to-output ratio cannot exceed the limit
_
: For simplicity in
the analysis, I will assume that once the limit is imposed, the government xes the ratio debt
over output at the debt limit. Therefore, (t) =
_
; and _(t) = 0: This means that from t0  T
on, the government budget constraint (17) becomes
[r(t0)  y(t0)]
_
+ [1  w(t)](1  ) +    1 = 0: (19)
Intuitively, constraining the issue of public debt will have important e¤ects on the way
government spending is nanced. In the absence of limits, the public sector has two instruments
available to pay back its expenditure. These instruments are debt and revenues from taxes.
When one of these tools is restricted (for example debt), the other (in this case taxes) will have
to adjust to keep the government budget constraint holding. Di¤erent models will react in a
di¤erent way to changes in taxes, and consequently will display di¤erent paths for growth.
Therefore, scal policy in this scenario di¤ers.
Denition 2 If there is a limit to debt, a scal policy consists initially of a pair f; wg constant
over time with public debt determined by equation (15). Then when the limit is imposed, scal
policy is a constant ; and a path for w(t) that satisfy equation (19).
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3 Competitive equilibrium
As usual, given scal policy, conditions from utility maximization are combined with those of
prot maximization, together with the balanced budget for the government and market clearing
conditions to characterize the competitive equilibrium of this economy.
Notice that when  = 0; and  = 0 the model collapses to a setup à-la-Barro, in which gov-
ernment spending enters the production function enhancing both capital and labor productivity.
However, if  = 1; and  = 1 it becomes a model in which government spending enters additively
the utility function, and the production side exhibits learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers
à-la-Romer. More concretely, I will refer to the rst case ( = 0; and  = 0) as the Government
in the Production Function (GPF) model, and to the second case ( = 1; and  = 1) as the
Government in the Utility Function (GUF) model.
In equilibrium, assuming symmetry among rms, aggregate and individual stocks of capital
are the same,
_
k(t) = k(t). Then using equation (14), output becomes
y(t) = [Ak(t)+(1 )l(t)1 (1 )(1 )]';
and the marginal products for capital and labor are, respectively,
Rk(t) = k(t)
'+'(1 ) 1[Al(t)1 (1 )(1 )]'; (20)
and
W (t) = (1  )l(t)(1 )' 1[Ak(t)+(1 )(1 )(1 )]'; (21)
where
' =
1
1  (1  )(1  ) :
In a competitive equilibrium, markets clear. Financial markets clearing implies
d(t) = k(t) + b(t); (22)
that is, assets demanded by the household, d(t), must equal total supply: private assets, k(t);
and public assets, b(t).
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It remains to state the clearing condition in the goods market
_k(t) = y(t)  c(t)  g(t)  k(t): (23)
Additionally, due to arbitrage conditions the following must hold:
r(t) = Rb(t) = Rk(t)  :
Denition 3 Taking as given the initial state, k(0) and b(0); and a scal policy, a competitive
equilibrium path for the economy described above consists of sequences for quantities fc(t); l(t);
k(t); b(t)g1t=0; and prices fr(t); !(t)g1t=0, such that:
(i) the triplet fc(t); x(t); _k(t)g1t=0 solves the representative households problem;
(ii) the pair fl(t); k(t)g1t=0 solves the representative rms problem;
(iii) the labor market clears,
x(t) + l(t) = 1;
the market for goods clears,
_k(t) = y(t)  c(t)  g(t)  k(t);
and capital markets clear,
d(t) = k(t) + b(t);
(iv) the governments budget constraint (15) holds,
_b(t) = Rb(t)b(t) + g(t)  w(t)W (t)l(t);
(v) and by no arbitrage, capital and public debt earn the same interest rate,
r(t) = Rb(t) = Rk(t)  :
The rst order conditions characterizing the competitive equilibrium are reported in the
Appendix.
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4 Balanced growth path
In this section the analysis concentrates on the balanced growth path,4 to account for the
long run e¤ects of scal policies. Time between parenthesis is removed to denote steady-state
variables.
Denition 4 A balanced growth path is dened as a competitive equilibrium path in which con-
sumption, government spending, output, debt and capital grow at the same rate, ; and in which
the time allocation (leisure, labor), interest and wage rates and the scal variables w; and  are
constant over time.
On the balanced growth path all positive growth rates are the same rate, ; which satises
 =
1
1  (1  )(Rk      );
where the following needs to hold
Rk > +  > (1  ) + ;
to ensure both endogenous growth and bounded utility, respectively. I will analyze all growing
variables in ratios of capital, k(t):
The balanced growth path (hereafter, BGP) in this economy is described by the set of values
of the variables f; l; c
k
;
y
k
;
b
k
g if there is no limit. If there is a limit to debt, the BGP is described
either by f; l; c
k
;
y
k
; wg or by f; l; c
k
;
y
k
; g; depending on which variable adjusts to satisfy the
debt limit. These variables must solve the following system of equations:
(1  l)(1  w)(1  ) y
kl
= (1  ) c
k
; (24)
 =
1
1  (1  )
h

y
k
     
i
; (25)
y
k
= A

l


y
k
(1 )1 
; (26)
 =
y
k
   y
k
  c
k
  ; (27)
4To ensure that the balanced growth path exists for this model, it is necessary to assume that the utility
function has the CES form, as it is the case here, where  > 0: See Lucas (1990) and Rebelo (1991).
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and if there is no limit to debt

y
k
+


y
k
     
 b
k
  w(1  )y
k
= 0; (28)
or if there is a limit
_
;
 +


y
k
     
 _
  w(1  ) = 0: (29)
Equation (24) represents the labor supply decision by households that depends on the after
tax wage rate and on consumption. Equation (25) is the growth rate of consumption that results
from the individuals optimization problem. Equation (26) is the production function in terms
of the output to capital ratio and labor. Equation (27) is the resource constraint. Finally, the
next two equations, (28) and (29), represent the government budget constraint without and with
limits, respectively.
In the presence of a debt limit,
_
; then
b
k
is determined by
y
k
; since the imposition of a limit
implies that
b
k
=
_

y
k
, and
_
 is xed. This means that any change in scal policy engineered
through taxes, w; make  endogenous whereas changes in the ratio of government spending
over output, ; will make labor tax rates endogenous.
5 Parameter values
In general, it is not possible to solve this model analytically. Actually, a closed form analytic
solution can be obtained for certain versions of model, but not when the labor-leisure choice is
made endogenous, as is the case here. To learn about the consequences of imposing limits to
public debt with respect to the standard case, I perform dynamic simulations using parameter
values which are conventional in public nance and macroeconomics literature.
The parameters of the model are ; ;  ; ; ; w; ; A; and : I assign values for ; ; ;
and  according to standard literature on endogenous growth. The rest of parameters, ; ; A;
w; are calibrated. Tables 1, and 2 summarize the results.
I set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ; equal to 2. The elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure, ; is calibrated to match a proportion of leisure to labor
around 0:4; as US data suggest. The discount parameter, ; is calibrated to get an annual real
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interest rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between public and private goods in the utility
function,  ; has no e¤ect on the balanced growth path since g(t) is not a choice variable for the
household. Therefore, it need not be assigned any value.
As in Stokey and Rebelo (1995), I compare economies that are observationally equivalent:
they are compared around an identical balanced growth path, but respond di¤erently to any
parameter change. To have the two models in the same steady-state, the adjustment is made
through the technological parameter, A. The annual depreciation rate, ; equals 10%, and has
been taken from previous estimates in the literature for US data. Finally, the capital share of
output, ; is assigned a value of 1/3.
Regarding scal variables, I need to determine the tax rate on labor income, w; and the
weight of government spending on output, . The tax rate on labor has been chosen to be
w = 36:47%; which corresponds to a government spending to output ratio, ; of 24%. All these
values imply a debt to output ratio, ; equal to 65%. Table 2 reports the values for the main
variables on the steady state.
6 Long run e¤ects of scal policy
In principle, if a government wants to control its budget has three possible instruments, debt,
taxes and government spending. Having one of them constrained (in this case debt) a¤ects the
allocation of the others (taxes and government spending). In order to control public debt (either
to reduce the amount of outstanding debt or just to prevent it from increasing without control)
the government can increase taxes or reduce government spending.
In this section, I analyze the long run e¤ects of scal policy (changes in the labor tax rate,
w, in the government spending to output ratio, ) in the two models considered (GPF and
GUF), and highlight the di¤erences induced by the imposition of debt limits. This will be done
abstracting from transitional dynamics. To understand the characteristics of the steady state
in the presence of limits, I compare balanced growth paths for di¤erent labor income taxes and
government spending over output ratios around a point at which the debt limit is just binding.
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6.1 An increase in the labor tax rate (w)
The rst experiment consists of increasing labor tax rates from 36.47% to 41.47%, keeping all
the rest of parameters unchanged. Figures 1 and 2 report the results for the GPF and GUF
models, respectively. In the gures, the solid lines refer to the economy without debt limits,
and the dashed lines denote the economy with the debt limit. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects on the
growth rate and the debt to capital ratio under debt limits for the two models considered, the
GPF (solid line) and the GUF (dashed line).
As expected, the long run e¤ects of rising taxes di¤er depending on the role of government
spending in the model. In the absence of debt limits for the GPF model a rise in the labor tax rate
has two opposite e¤ects on labor supply. On one hand, it diminishes the wages e¤ectively earned
by households. This reduces the incentives to work, a¤ecting negatively output, revenues from
taxes, and therefore growth. On the other hand, it has a positive direct e¤ect on government
spending, and a¤ects positively the productivity of labor, which raises labor supply. In the
gures the rst e¤ect dominates, inducing a reduction of labor. Figure 1 shows that in the
economy without debt limits the fall in labor reduces output and therefore the growth rate of
the economy. Given that government spending is a constant fraction  of output (recall equation
(14)), public consumption is also reduced, what enhances the fall in the growth rate. Private
consumption is diminished too.
With limits to debt the two opposite e¤ects of the rise in taxes on labor are still at work.
However, government nances behave di¤erently. Given that the ratio of public debt to output
cannot change, the rising revenues from labor income are completely devoted to higher govern-
ment spending. The mechanism can be derived from equation (29). In the GPF model, higher
public expenditure increases the growth rate of the economy and this positive e¤ect is transmit-
ted to the rest of variables. Therefore, unlike in the model without limits, the nal outcome is
an increase in output, public spending, and growth.
The same results hold for the GUF model in the absence of limits. It is worth noticing
that the e¤ects on the growth rate are larger in the GPF than in the GUF model due to the
externalities induced by productive public spending. The reason is that in the latter higher
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public spending does not a¤ect labor productivity, whereas labor taxes do. As a result, in the
GUF model the rise in tax rates reduces both public and private consumption. When there is a
limit to debt issue, the rise in taxes allows for higher government spending, which weakens the
negative e¤ects of scal policy.
After analyzing the e¤ects in each model, what is the main di¤erence between models of
introducing debt limits? In the presence of limits to debt, raising tax rates on labor has positive
e¤ects on growth when the economys growth is propelled by public spending and there are limits
on the debt-to-output ratio. When private investment drives growth, rising taxes on labor only
serves to increase government spending and to reduce the incentives to work, with a negative
e¤ect on growth. This shows that the role of government spending has in the economy is crucial
in determining the long run growth e¤ects of changes in taxes when there is a limit to debt.
6.2 A fall in the government spending to output ratio ()
Next, I consider the long run e¤ects of changes in the share of government spending on output.
I will assume that if there is a limit constraining public debt, the government has to change
taxes, to maintain the budget constraint holding. The change in  is from 24% to 22%.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the results. Figure 4 refers to the GPF model, Figure 5 shows the
GUF model. As before, the solid lines refer to the economy without debt limits, whereas the
dashed lines denote the economy with a limit to debt. Figure 6 compares both models in terms
of the e¤ects on the growth rate and the debt to capital ratio, when there is a limit imposed.
Figure 4 shows that in the GPF model, reducing  a¤ects negatively all variables. Notice
that these reductions are less pronounced (or even positive as in the case of labor) if there is a
limit to debt. Recall that now with the debt ceiling, a change in  implies a change in taxes
to keep the government budget constraint (29) balanced. Having debt issue controlled by the
limit, the tax rate implied by lower  need not be so high as before. This has a positive e¤ect
on labor supply, and prevents it from falling.
However, in the GUF model the same fall in  only a¤ects individualswelfare, with no direct
e¤ect on growth. Figure 5 shows a lower level of public consumption to output ratio induces
lower output, and labor. The nal e¤ect on growth is negative. Keeping taxes constant, the
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resources from reducing  go to increase debt issue. Labor falls and so does output, reducing
the growth rate. Notice, however, that in the economy with a debt ceiling the fall in  has the
opposite e¤ects as a rise in taxes, that is, increases the growth rate.
Summarizing, in the GPF model, reducing  a¤ects negatively growth with stronger e¤ects
in the absence of limits to debt. The fall in  reduces growth both in the GPF and GUF models
in the absence of limits, with stronger e¤ects when government spending is productive.
7 Transitional dynamics
Although the analysis above has concentrated on the balanced growth path, the two models
considered in this paper display transitional dynamics. The analysis of the dynamics focuses
only on the GPF model.
To recover the equilibrium path of the variables, the following procedure is employed.
1. The set of optimal conditions for the competitive equilibrium (equations A1-A10 in the
Appendix) has to be expressed in terms of the normalized variables. Therefore, growing
variables are expressed in ratios to capital, k(t).
2. The system is reduced to the least number of variables. I denote the vector of un-
knowns as z(t) = f(t); (t); (t); l(t)g; where (t) = b(t)
k(t)
; (t) =
c(t)
k(t)
; and (t) =
y(t)
k(t)
:
Notice that when the debt limit is imposed, there is an additional equation (the one
imposed by the debt limit), and an additional unknown w(t). Thus, z(t) becomes
z0(t) = f(t); (t); (t); l(t); w(t)g:
3. To recover the path of the original series I need to characterize the balanced growth path
to which the new variables would converge. Given the nonlinearity of the resulting model,
I linearize it around the new balanced growth path in order to solve it. The linearized
systems have the following structure
A
ez(t) +Bez(t) = 0; that is, ez(t) = P ez(t);
where P =  A 1B; and ez(t) = z(t)   _z; where _z denotes variables on the new balanced
growth path. Once this system is solved, I obtain the path for the vector ez(t) in terms of
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; the matrix of stable eigenvalues of matrix P: Stability requires the resulting series not
to be explosive, that is, in continuous time the elements in  must be negative.
In what follows, I investigate the dynamics of the economy when scal policy is tightened in
order to reduce the debt to output ratio to a new limit. Fiscal policy in this analysis will take
two di¤erent forms. Recall that in the absence of debt limits, scal policy is dened as a pair
f; wg constant over time that imply a path for government debt consistent with the no-Ponzi
game condition (16). In the presence of debt limits, scal policy consists of a constant  and a
path for w(t) that make the ratio of debt over output constant and equal to the limit imposed,
_
: For simplicity, I will consider the case in which there is only one period of transition between
regimes, that is, T = 1 in chart (18). This is the simplest way to study the dynamic e¤ects of
imposing the limit, since I avoid calculating the branch of the dynamics between the time of the
announcement and the moment when the limit becomes active, T:
7.1 An increase in the labor tax rate (w)
In this section, I will study the transitional dynamics of an economy that raises taxes in order to
achieve a lower ratio of debt to output. As mentioned above, for simplicity the moment in which
the debt limit is enforced is T = 1: The dynamics o¤ balanced growth paths for an economy
that raises taxes to attain a lower debt level are compared with the initial balanced growth path,
that is, an economy growing at a constant growth rate without the imposition of any debt limit
or any other change in scal policy, that will be taken as benchmark.
Figure 7 displays the results of a temporary rise in the labor tax rate from 36.47% to 40%,
implying a drop in the debt to output ratio from 65% to 60%. In the gures, the solid lines refer
to the model without limits to debt, and the dashed lines draw the results for the model with
limits. The panels of the gure depict the paths for consumption, output, labor, government
spending, the growth rate of capital, the debt to output ratio, and the labor income tax. All
variables are expressed as fractions of their initial balanced growth path values.
After the initial exogenous change in taxes, the debt is reduced to hit the ceiling as imposed.
What are the e¤ects for the rest of variables? Since
b
y
is constrained by the limit, taxes become
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endogenous, and converge to a new balanced growth path with lower labor income taxes. This
a¤ects positively labor, which increases. Although it may seem counterintuitive, lower taxes
result in high government spending. Given the assumption of a xed spending ratio,  =
g
y
; and
given the productive role of government spending in this economy, lower tax distortions result
in more output and more government spending as well as increased consumption and growth.
That is, if the economy raises labor income taxes to reduce debt and maintain it at a x ratio
over output, the economy will converge to a new balanced growth path in which consumption,
output, labor, and growth all will be higher, labor income taxes lower and government spending
will increase with respect to an economy that stays at its initial balanced growth path.
7.2 A reduction in the government spending to output ratio ()
Following with the analysis parallel to the balanced growth path, this subsection analyzes a
reduction in the ratio of government spending to output, ; from 24% to 22%, once and for all
at time T = 1. In this case, the economy uses changes in  to reduce its debt to output ratio and
attain another balanced growth path with the debt limit. As before, two cases are compared,
without limits or any other change in scal policy (the benchmark), and with limits. Recall that
in the case with debt limits, the change in  makes labor tax rates, w; endogenous.
As in the previous case, the solid lines refer to the model without limits to debt, and the
dashed lines draw the results for the model with limits. The analysis will focus on the paths
for consumption, output, labor, government spending, the growth rate of capital, the debt to
output ratio, and labor income tax rates. As before, all variables are expressed as fractions of
their initial steady-state values. Figure 8 reports the results.
When government spending is diminished to reduce the amount of debt over output, it
a¤ects negatively consumption, output, and the growth rate. Notice that reducing government
consumption and debt allows the economy to enjoy lower labor income taxes. The immediate
e¤ect is a rise in labor supply. Thus, the reduction of  to attain a level of debt over output
below the initial one, and stick to it, leads the economy to a new balanced growth path with
lower consumption, output, growth rate, government spending, and taxes, and higher labor.
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The main di¤erence between this scal policy and the former relies in the sign of the e¤ects.
When taxes are raised to reduce
b
y
; the e¤ects on consumption, output and the growth rate go
in the opposite direction than when government spending is reduced. Although both policies are
conducted to reduce the amount of outstanding debt, the dynamics o¤ steady states conrm the
results previously obtained in the long run analysis: increasing taxes in the presence of limits
to debt a¤ects positively the growth rate. Now, the dynamics adds the notion of what happens
with consumption and labor. With initially higher taxes on labor income, the representative
household enjoys higher consumption and lower taxes in the following periods. When government
spending is reduced, consumption is lower and labor higher. What are the nal e¤ects on welfare
is the focus of the next section.
8 Welfare analysis
In the two former sections, I have analyzed the e¤ects on growth of di¤erent scal policies in
economies with limits to debt. Raising labor income taxes had positive growth e¤ects in contrast
with reductions in government spending. However, what are the consequences for individuals
welfare? In this section, I study the welfare e¤ects of the changes in scal policy analyzed before
in the economy with debt limits and for the case in which government spending is a productive
input (the GPF model).
The welfare cost of implementing a given scal policy comes from the comparison of the
levels of welfare at the starting balanced growth path and during the transition o¤ the balanced
growth paths. In this economy, welfare on the balanced growth path, WBGP ; is given by
WBGP =
Z +1
0
U [cBGP ; xBGP ]e
 tdt =
Z +1
0
"
(cBGPx
1 
BGP )
1 
1  
#
e tdt =
=
Z +1
0
"
(c0e
0tx1 0 )
1 
1  
#
e tdt;
where zero subscripts denote the initial balanced growth path, and where the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion, ; has been set equal to 2. Note that at the initial balanced growth path
all variables grow at the same rate, 0: Recall that  = 0 because the analysis focuses on the
GPF model.
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The level of welfare attained during the transitional dynamics,WTD; is given by the following
expression:
WTD =
Z +1
0
U [c(t); x(t)]e tdt =
Z +1
0

[c(t)x(t)1 ]1 
1  

e tdt:
Recall from the discussion in previous sections that c(t) = k(t)(t); and k(t) = k0ek(t)t; where
k(t) denotes the growth rate of capital at time t: Given the endogenous character of labor, I
cannot study welfare implications of scal policy explicitly. Therefore I simulate the economy.
I follow Lucas (1987) and measure the welfare cost of scal policies as the proportion of
consumption in the initial balanced growth path the agent would be willing to lose in order not
to experience the change in consumption after the scal policy experiment. This cost will be
denoted by &; and can be computed as follows:
WBGP =
Z +1
0
U [cBGP (1  &); xBGP ]e tdt =WTD;
that is,
& = 1 

WTD
WBGP
 1
(1  ) ;
where WTD depends on w and .
Table 3 reports the welfare cost, &; of the two scal policies analyzed as percentage of initial
BGP consumption in the presence of limits to debt. The welfare cost associated with an increase
in labor tax rates is lower than when government spending over output is reduced. In the former
case, this is due to the increase in labor and the growth rate, that drive the economy to a new
balanced growth path with higher levels of consumption. When government spending is reduced
the welfare cost is much higher. The reason is the reduction in consumption and the increase in
labor that can be seen in Figure 8.
Summarizing, a scal policy consisting on raising taxes to attain a lower debt to output
ratio results in higher growth and less welfare cost than other scal policy that has government
spending over output as its instruments.
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9 Conclusions and extensions
The aim of this paper is to investigate the growth and welfare consequences of imposing debt
limits on the governments budget constraint. The long run e¤ects of increases in taxes on
labor, and reductions in the government spending to output ratio are analyzed in two di¤erent
endogenous growth models with labor-leisure choice, in an environment with and without limits
to debt. The two models considered di¤er in the weight and role government spending is given,
either as productive spending (entering in the production function), or as providing public
services (in the utility function) being private capital what drives growth in the latter case.
The existence of debt limits is crucial for the growth e¤ects of di¤erent scal policies. In
the long run, if there is no debt limit, the growth e¤ects of raising labor income taxes are
negative regardless of the role of government spending, and vice versa. However, which role
public spending plays in the economy is determinant for the growth e¤ects of changes in the
ratio of public expenditures to output. Interestingly, in the presence of a limit to debt, higher
labor tax rates have a positive e¤ect on growth if government spending is productive.
I also investigate the dynamic e¤ects of using scal policy to reduce public debt in order
to attain a debt limit with a lower debt to output ratio, and compare them with an economy
without limits which stays at its balanced growth path. This analysis is done for the case in
which government spending is a productive input. I nd that raising taxes to lower debt leads
the economy to a new balanced growth path with higher growth and lower taxes. This is due to
the role of government spending in this model. By the same reason, a scal policy consisting of
reducing government spending over output has the opposite e¤ects, reducing growth and output.
Regarding welfare, in the presence of limits to debt, higher labor income taxes imply a lower
welfare cost than reducing government spending. The reason is the higher levels of consumption
that the representative household enjoys if taxes are used as the instrument of scal policy.
The introduction of public debt and the imposition of limits to this borrowing in the way
it is done in this paper is novel in the framework of endogenous growth models. Moreover, in
contrast with traditional models of growth that focus on the growth e¤ects of distortionary taxes
disregarding debt issues, the setup presented here o¤ers a lot of new possibilities to analyze the
e¤ects of di¤erent scal policies.
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One interesting experiment would be to study the dynamics of the economy with a longer
transitional period. This economy would receive at some time t the announcement of a debt
limit becoming enforced at a given time T > t. This economy would undertake the appropriate
scal policy measures in order to reduce (t) from t to T; and converge smoothly to the debt
limit at time T: In this experiment xing the time T will give us the exact change in scal policy
needed at time t, and vice versa. This experiment will be useful to analyze, for example, the
preliminary e¤ects of the criteria imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, and the consequences of
the possible scal policies implemented afterwards.
Furthermore, Barro (1990) nds that the tax rate that maximizes growth is the same that
maximizes individualswelfare. It would be interesting to investigate whether it is also the case
here. In this sense, setting up the second best problem would allow the government to optimally
design scal policy taking into account rst order conditions from individuals optimization.
Here, the Ramsey problem may allow the government to choose just the optimal tax structure,
taking as given g(t); or deciding on both scal variables, when there are limits to public debt
and therefore its nancial options are constrained.
In conclusion, the introduction of limits on public debt in endogenous growth models inau-
gurates a new step in understanding the performance of scal policy in this environment, both
in the long run and during the transition.
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Appendix: First order conditions for the competitive equilibrium
The conditions for competitive equilibrium in the general setup are given by the following set
of equations:
(1  w)W (t)
(1  ) =
c(t)
[1  l(t)] ; (A1)
_(t)
(t)
= [  r(t)]; (A2)
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1
(1  )  1
"
(1  )(1  )
_l(t)
1  l(t) +
_(t)
(t)
#
; (A3)
r(t) = 
y(t)
k(t)
  ; (A4)
W (t) = (1  )y(t)
l(t)
; (A5)
_k(t) = y(t)  g(t)  c(t)  k(t); (A6)
_b(t) = r(t)b(t) + g(t)  wW (t)l(t); (A7)
g(t) = y(t); (A8)
% Ak(t)[l(t)g(t)]1 ;
y(t)
& Ak(t)l(t)1 ;
(A9)
lim
t!1e
 t(t)d(t) = 0; (A10)
where (t) is the shadow price associated to the households budget constraint. Equations (A1),
(A2) and (A3) describe optimal choices of the household. Conditions (A4), and (A5) are the
optimal input demands by rms. Equations (A6) and (A7) report the laws of motion of the
two state variables of the system. Finally, equation (A8) describes scal policy, equation (A9)
species the production function depending on the model considered, and equation (A10) states
the transversality condition.
The system dened above fully describes the competitive equilibrium in the economy together
with the constraint on l(t) 2 [0; 1]:
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Technology parameter GUF model  = 1; A = 0:1799
Technology parameter GPF model  = 0; A = 2:1494
Capital share of output  = 1=3
Depreciation rate  = 0:0238
Government spending-to-output ratio  = 0:24
Labor tax rate w = 0:3647
Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution  = 2
Discount parameter  = 0:0026
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure  = 0:4481
Table 2: Balanced Growth Path Values
Growth rate () 0:0050
Nominal interest rate (r) 0:0098
Consumption-to-capital ratio ( ck ) 0:0479
Government spending-to-capital ratio ( gk ) 0:0242
Output-to-capital ratio ( yk ) 0:1009
Public debt-to-capital ratio ( bk ) 0:0656
Labor ( l) 0:4198
For the sake of comparison, steady state values are common to the two models (GUF and GPF).
Table 3: Welfare e¤ects of scal policies
Welfare cost ( &)
An increase in labor tax rates
with limits 14:62%
A decrease in government spending over output
with limits 25:71%
The welfare cost of scal policies, &; is expressed as percentage of initial BGP consumption.
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Figure 1: Changes in the GPF model for di¤erent taxes on labor income. The solid line reports
the model without debt limits, and the dashed line stands for the model with limits.
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Figure 2: Changes in the GUF model for di¤erent taxes on labor income. The solid line reports
the model without debt limits, and the dashed line stands for the model with limits.
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Figure 3: Changes in the GPF and GUF models for di¤erent tax rates on labor income. The
solid line reports the GPF model, and the dashed line the GUF model, both cases in the presence
of debt limits.
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Figure 4: Changes in the GPF model for di¤erent : The solid line reports the model without
debt limits, and the dashed line stands for the model with limits.
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Figure 5: Changes in the GUF model for di¤erent : The solid line reports the model without
debt limits, and the dashed line stands for the model with limits.
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Figure 6: Changes in the GPF and GUF models for di¤erent : The solid line reports the GPF
model, and the dashed line stands for the GUF model, both cases in the presence of debt limits.
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Figure 7: The GPF model after a rise in the labor tax rate. The solid line reports the model
without limits to debt, and the dashed line stands for the model with debt limits. All variables
are expressed as fractions of their initial BGP values.
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Figure 8: The GPF model after a fall in . The solid line reports the model without limits to
debt, and the dashed line stands for the model with debt limits. All variables are expressed as
fractions of their initial BGP values.
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